TRENDOWSKI & ALLEN, P.C. 

NEWSLETTERS

                           LIQUOR LIABILITY         JUNE 2010                           ISSUE XIV

 Visibility Revisited

       Some months ago, I wrote about the visibility requirement under the Dram Shop Act, CGS 30-102, and how there are a growing number of cases where trial level judges are discarding the requirement, leaving juries to come up with their own definition of intoxication. Since my last article, I spent four weeks on trial with a Dram Shop case where the judge told the jury that there was no visibility requirement under the Dram Act. The result was a mess, with the jury deadlocking and four weeks of trial and costs going down the tubes.

 
        In Arrone vs. Antonio, the plaintiff claimed that she was a passenger in an open Jeep when she was thrown from the vehicle due to the driver’s intoxication. She sustained a significant head injury, though she made an excellent recovery. The complaint alleged two causes of action: one being a statutory Dram claim; the second being a common law reckless service of alcohol claim. The driver claimed that he had four drinks over the course of the evening and did not believe he was intoxicated.

        The judge explained the law to the jury before they went into deliberations, using the long-accepted definition of intoxication from Saunders vs. Officer’s Club (i.e., intoxication must be apparent) and adding that the intoxication may be proven in a number of ways, including testimony from toxicologists, the driver’s testimony, witnesses, etc. A written copy of the charge was given to the jurors as is often done in cases over the past several years. After a relatively short time, the jurors sent out two questions: the first being whether the plaintiff had to prove visible intoxication under the Dram Shop Act; the second requesting a definition of intoxication. The judge responded to the jurors that it was not a requirement to prove visible intoxication and that there was no clear definition. The jurors returned to the jury room, then sent out a note that they were deadlocked and could not reach a verdict. They were instructed to try to break the deadlock, but sent out three more notes over the next three days saying that they could not agree on a verdict. After the fourth attempt, the judge released them and declared a mistrial.

       I spoke to all of the jurors afterwards. They were deadlocked five to one in favor of the restaurant. The hold-out juror told me she had decided that a single drink would impair driving abilities to some extent. As such, that was “intoxication” in her mind. She stuck to her guns, ultimately causing the mistrial. As the jurors had no definition of intoxication, she was free to do so. Now the entire case will have to be tried again.

        Several aspects of this experience were distressing. First, in 27 years of trying cases in Connecticut, I have never had a judge instruct a jury that there was no visibility requirement. Secondly, if visibility is not the standard, then what is? The hold-out juror had decided that a single drink was intoxication and, under the instruction given, was free to do so. Finally, there are tens of thousands of drinks served all across the state each day. Responsible servers in the hospitality industry train their people to detect visible intoxication. In this case, the restaurant owner had his employees TIPS trained and recertified every few years. By the hold-out juror’s standard, however, you roll the dice on a $250,000 Dram Shop payment every single time you serve a drink, no matter how the patron looks.

        While I fully agree that the word “visible” is not in the Dram Shop statute, it is a workable standard that has been adopted by a number of states. It gives the liquor seller an opportunity to cease service, and all of the national responsible service programs focus on visible signs. I have heard many attorneys and a few judges state that there should be no visibility standard, and that Dram liability should simply be a risk of doing business - period. The question in my mind is why? What is so wrong with the visibility standard such that it must be rejected? We will see.

LIQUOR LIABILITY           MAY 2010                           ISSUE XIII

This month, I am pleased to print a research article from Attorney Jennifer Lucas of the Putnam Judicial District.  There is a split at the trial level in Connecticut as to whether the injured person’s participation in the intoxication can be used as a defense to a statutory Dram Shop action.  Attorney Lucas kindly took the time to research the issue and create a synopsis of the significant decisions pro and con. 

Superior Court Split of Authority

Regarding The Viability of The Special Defenses of

"Participation"  & "Assumption of Risk" to

Dram Shop Actions (General Statutes  § 30-102)

The Connecticut Appellate Courts have not yet addressed the use of “assumption of the risk” and “participation” as special defenses to a Dram Shop action.  There is a split of authority among Superior Court decisions as to the validity of the aforementioned defenses in a cause of action based on the Dram Shop Act.

Decisions Holding that “Participation” and “Assumption of Risk” are Viable Defenses to Statutory Dram Shop Claim:

(I)

Those decisions that have allowed the defenses have reasoned that the act is primarily remedial in nature and is intended to limit recovery to innocent third party victims.

Baio v. Oracle Loune, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5012087 (October 15, 2008, Licari, J.).

Decision concerning a motion to strike. With regard to the special defense alleging “participation,” the court stated that it was persuaded by the line of cases recognizing such defense in dram shop cases; citing Breen v. Brother Bones Café, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 93 0523016 (October 14, 1994, Corradino, J.).  Likewise, with regard to the special defense alleging “assumption of risk,” the court found the line of cases following Breen persuasive, specifically noting that it was the estate of the intoxicated person, as opposed to an innocent third party, making the initial claims.  Accordingly, the court denied the motion to strike the aforementioned defenses.

 Nolan v. Schuster, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 0145395 (December 4, 1998, Espinosa, J.) (23 Conn. L. Rptr. 552).

Decision concerning a motion to strike the special defense of “assumption of the risk.”  The special defense asserted by the defendants alleged that the plaintiff-passenger assumed the risks of this conduct by procuring alcohol for the defendant-intoxicated driver, who was at the time a minor, and thereafter voluntarily and willingly riding in the automobile with the intoxicated.  The court adopted the reasoning set forth in the line of Superior Court cases which have held that assumption of the risk is a defense to an alleged violation of the Dram Shop Act.  Citing Breen v. Brother Bones Café, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 93 0523016 (October 14, 1994, Corradino, J.) (When a plaintiff’s conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, then the (assumption of risk) doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence should apply.)  Accordingly, the court denied the motion to strike.

Breen v. Brother Bones Café, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 93 0523016 (October 14, 1994, Corradino, J.).

Decision concerning a motion to strike.  With regard to the special defense of participation, the court noted that “[t]he primary purpose of the [Dram Shop Act] was to try to punish people whose actions contribute to the carnage on our highways.”  Accordingly, the court held that “a participation defense is permitted . . . but a person advancing such a participation defense would have a heavy burden in showing that the participation alleged rose to the level of complicity and in effect contributed substantially to causing the intoxication . . . . [M]erely accompanying and drinking with an intoxicated person does not bar recovery by a plaintiff.  Rather, the plaintiff is barred from recovery only if he or she was an active participant in causing the intoxication . . . .”  With regard to the special defense alleging “assumption of the risk,” the court noted that “the defendant is not technically pleading assumption of risk but comparative negligence.”  The court further noted that “nothing in the dram shop act itself prevents assumption of risk concerns from being taken into account . . . .”  Accordingly, the court denied the motion to strike as to both special defenses.

Sego v. Debco, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 92 039650 (September 8, 1994, Skolnick, J.).

Decision concerning a motion to strike.  With regard to the special defense of “assumption of the risk,” the court held that it agreed with the line of cases finding such defense viable against a dram shop claim, and therefore denied the motion to strike as to that special defense.  Quoting Sanders v. The Officers’ Club of Connecticut, Inc., 35 Conn. Sup. 91, 95, 397 A.2d 122 (1978), the court noted “[i]t appears that such a defense is proper within the boundaries of voluntarily and willingly assuming the risk of another’s intoxication, for example by accepting a ride from one known by the plaintiff to be drunk.”  Similarly, the court also quoted Gelosa v. Sagan, 1 Conn. L. Rptr. 141, 143 (January 3, 1990, Mulcahy, J.) in stating: “Since the statute is primarily remedial in nature, and apparently intended to limit recovery to innocent third party victims, the defense [of assumption of the risk] bars recovery in a Dram Shop action where the plaintiff comprehended the risk of harm and voluntarily subjected [him]self to it.”  With regard to the special defense of “participation,” the court agreed with the position advanced by Superior Court decisions holding that “the statute is remedial in nature and therefore available only to innocent third party victims,” and accordingly denied the motion to strike as to that special defense as well.

 (II)

Decisions Holding that “Participation” and “Assumption of Risk” Are Not Viable Defenses to a Statutory Dram Shop Claim:

Those decisions that have not permitted the use of these defenses have reasoned that the protection of the Act

 is not limited to innocent third parties, but is instead intended to protect the public at large.

Welton v. Ferrara, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 5014334 (October 2, 2008, Blue, J.) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 399).

Decision concerning a motion to strike.  With regard to the special defense alleging “participation,” the court held: “The judicially created doctrine of participation is inconsistent with the legislative scheme of placing the economic burden of intoxication-related injuries on dram shops. . . .  The obvious purpose of the legislation is to aid the enforcement of [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86] by imposing a penalty, in the form of a civil liability, in addition to the penalty prescribed in that section, and to protect the public. . . .  A judicially created defense of participation would frustrate this purpose.  The public is manifestly endangered by intoxicated persons, particularly when those persons operate motor vehicles, and that danger is in no way lessened by the participation of other in the intoxication.”  The court further noted: “Our Supreme Court has held that contributory negligence is not a valid defense to a Dram Shop suit. . . .  The participation doctrine would effectively reestablish contributory negligence as a defense.”  With regard to the special defense alleging “assumption of the risk,” the court held that “[t]he legal doctrine of assumption of the risk has been abolished legislatively with respect to negligence actions.”  Citing General Statutes § 52-572h (1).  Accordingly, the court granted the motion to strike as to both special defenses.

Waldron
v. Ohler, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 07 5002709 (March 17, 2008, Pickard, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 200).

Decision concerning a motion to strike the special defense of “assumption of the risk” alleged by the defendant permittee.   The court held that it “is of the opinion that assumption of the risk is not a valid special defense when asserted by the purveyor of the alcoholic liquor.”  The court reasoned: “While a plaintiff may properly be alleged to have assumed the risk of the reckless or wanton operation of a vehicle by a driver that he knew or should have known was intoxicated, as several cases have held, he can not be held to have ‘assumed the risk’ that a seller of alcoholic beverages continued to serve such beverages to a person known to be intoxicated.  General Statutes § 30-102 does not regulate the driver of the vehicle, only the seller of the intoxicating beverage. While a plaintiff may not be a totally ‘innocent third party’ with respect to the principal tortfeasor, he is such with respect to the party who allegedly sold the intoxicating beverage to an already intoxicated person.”  Accordingly, the court granted the motion to strike.

Hersey v. Up Or On the Rocks, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV 07 5001286 (November 13, 2007, Vacchelli, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 589).

 Decision concerning an application for a prejudgment remedy.  Dram Shop action was brought by the decedent passenger’s estate against the liquor permittee.  Defendants argued that the application should be denied due to the likelihood that they will prevail on their defense of assumption of the risk.  The court held the defense of “assumption of the risk [is] not available in a Dram Shop action as a matter of law.”  The court reasoned that while assumption of the risk is traditionally a defense to a negligence action, it is “not available in suits based on a statutory violation.”  Citing Supreme Court authority, the court further noted: “The act . . . provides an action in strict liability, both without the burden of proving the element of scienter essential to a negligence action and without the benefit of the broader scope of recovery permitted under such an action.” Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 328, 813 A,2d 1003 (2003).  The decedent was a protected party within the purview of that statute.  To deny her a remedy in this case would thwart the work of the legislature.  That, the courts cannot do by construction. Martin v. Martin, 99 Conn.App. 145, 151, 913 A.2d 451 (2007).  If the legislature had wanted to excuse liability in cases such as this, it could have expressed that in the statute.”  Accordingly, the court sided with the line of Superior Court decision that have found that the assumption of the risk defense is not available in a Dram Shop case, and granted the application for the prejudgment remedy.

Pont v. Barker, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 4002020 (May 30, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 445).

Decision concerning a motion to strike the special defenses of “participation” and “assumption of the risk.”  With regard to the special defense of participation, the court noted that “to allow a defense of participation by a vendor of liquor would defeat by judicial amendment the legislative purpose in enacting the Dram Shop Act statute.  The court further stated:  “[A] vendor of liquor should bear the loss for damages to third persons as a result of sales to intoxicated persons . . . those decisions allowing a participation defense rely upon the rationale that as a participant in the consumption of alcohol with the intoxicated person, the participant is not innocent of the intoxication of the intoxicated person, and thus is not entitled to relief from the act. . . .  This rationale fails to recognize that the participant could not be able to participate in the consumption of alcohol with the intoxicated person without the vendor selling him or her the alcohol being consumed. . . .  The legislature has placed the onus on the vendor for selling alcohol to the intoxicated persons. . . .  Reading a requirement of innocence into the statute does not comport with the public policy prompting its passage or its express language.”  With regard to the special defense of assumption of the risk, citing to its earlier decision in Buzon v. Ballard & Kane, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 568685 (September 6, 2005, Hurley, J.T.R.) (39 Conn. L. Rptr. 909) and Rivera v. Miceli, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 04 0104721 (April 15, 2005, Silbert, J.) (39 Conn. L. Rtpr. 151), the court held that assumption of the risk is not a valid defense to a dram shop claim in Connecticut.  The court specifically noted: “General Statutes § 30-102 does not regulate the driver of the vehicle, only the seller of the intoxicating beverage.  While a plaintiff may not be a totally ‘innocent third party’ with respect to the principal tortfeasor, he is such with respect to the party who allegedly sold the intoxicating beverage to an already intoxicated person.”  Accordingly, the court granted the motion to strike as to both special defenses.

Rivera v. Miceli, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 04 0104721 (April 15, 2005, Silbert, J.) (39 Conn. L. Rptr. 151).

Decision concerning a motion to strike the special defense of “assumption of the risk.”  The court held that it agreed with the line of cases disallowing assumption of the risk as a defense to a Dram Shop claim.  The court reasoned: General Statutes § 30-102 is “part of a detailed scheme for the regulation of an entire industry.  It provides a direct cause of action against a seller of intoxicating beverages to already intoxicated persons, who, in consequence of their intoxication, cause damages to others. . . .  General Statutes § 30-102 does not regulate the driver of the vehicle, only the seller of the intoxicating beverage.  While a plaintiff may not be a totally ‘innocent third party’ with respect to the principal tortfeasor, he is such with respect to the party who allegedly sold the intoxicating beverage to an already intoxicated person.” Accordingly, the court granted the motion to strike.

Jones v. Cross, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 03 0176102 (December 8, 2003, Gallagher, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 85).

Decision concerning a motion for articulation of the court’s granting of a motion to strike the special defenses of “assumption of the risk” and “participation.”  Quoting Penn v. Laboy, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 508818 (July 30, 1990, Axelrod, J.) (2 Conn.L.Rptr. 165), the court articulated:  “[T]here is nothing in section 30-102 (Dram Shop Act) that allows assumption of risk as a defense.  Changes in the express grounds for recovery under section 30-102 should be a matter for the legislature.  Further, there is nothing in section 30-102 that allows participation as a defense.  If the damage limitation in section 30-102 is to be reduced, then the proper remedy to reduce the statutory limit is by legislative action rather than by creating a defense that was not established by the legislature.”  In summation, the court further noted that “the special defense[s] available to the defendant driver [are] not available to the purveyor of alcohol in an action brought pursuant to the statute.” 

 (III) 

Decision Holding that “Assumption of Risk” Is Not a Viable Defense to a Statutory

Dram Shop Claim, But “Participation” is a Viable Defense to a Statutory Dram Shop

Claim If the Plaintiff Actively Procures or Causes the Tortfeasor’s Intoxication:

Blondin v. Meshack, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5018828 (October 2, 2008, Lager, J.) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 396).

Decision concerning a motion to strike.  Therein, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was barred from recovery “by knowingly and voluntarily riding as a passenger in the automobile driven by [the intoxicated].” In concluding that assumption of risk is not a valid defense to a dram shop action, the court noted that the doctrine had fallen into disfavor.  The court further noted:  “Because assumption of risk acts as a complete bar to recovery by a plaintiff . . . allowing it to be asserted as a defense to a dram shop action would be inconsistent with the dual punitive and remedial purposes of the act.  An assumption of the risk defense carves out too broad an exception to the public policy underlying the dram shop act of policing the conduct of the liquor seller for the purpose of protecting the general public. . . .   While a plaintiff may properly be alleged to have assumed the risk of the reckless or wanton operation  of a vehicle by a driver that he knew or should have known was intoxicated . . . he cannot be held to have ‘assumed the risk’ that a seller of alcoholic beverages continued to serve such beverages to a person known to be intoxicated.”  (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.  Citing  Rivera v. Miceli, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. 04-0104721 (April 15, 2005, Silbert, J.)

With regard to the defendants’ special defenses asserting “participation,” the defendants argued that the plaintiff-passenger supplied alcohol to the alleged intoxicated driver, consumed alcoholic beverages with him, and thus participated in the alleged intoxication of the driver.  In concluding that the defense of participation was sufficient, as alleged, the court noted: A “narrow defense that permits a comparison between the plaintiff’s conduct in contributing to the intoxication of the tortfeasor with the purveyor’s conduct in violating the statute does not appear to be inconsistent with the punitive and remedial purposes of the dram shop act.”  The court concluded that “it makes sense that one whose actions made the violation of the act possible by himself giving the intoxicated person liquor . . . may potentially have some responsibility, along with the liquor seller, for any injury he later incurs as a result of the conduct of the intoxicated person.  The court further noted that “it is consistent with the remedial and punitive purposes of the dram shop act because it does not fully relieve the liquor seller of responsibility.”  The court, however, cautioned that “participation in this sense requires that the plaintiff actively procure or cause the tortfeasor’s intoxication; that is, the plaintiff cannot merely participate in the drinking activities but must be actively involved in bringing about the inebriate’s intoxication.”

            LIQUOR LIABILITY               APRIL 2010                                    ISSUE XII


Exclusion Delusions

I met with an attorney recently who asked my advice on a liquor lawsuit he was bringing.  The claim involved a minor who drank at an establishment and was killed in a one-car accident after leaving a bar. Regardless of other issues, the primary defense raised by the insurer was that there was no coverage for liquor liability under the bar's insurance policy. The defense attorney quoted from the exclusions in the policy that there was no coverage for any liability resulting from the sale of alcohol; and indeed, that is what the exclusions quite plainly stated. The exclusions really couldn't have been more clear.  Under the standard language for a Commercial General Liability Policy, a "CGL" in insurance parlance, liquor coverage is excluded in every shape and form.

What the attorneys had missed, however, was that there were TWO policies issued to the bar:  a CGL policy for general liability such as fall downs; and a separate liquor liability policy which expressly covered all liability arising from the provision of alcohol.  Each of the exclusions which the insurance attorney cited were applicable only to the CGL policy, not the liquor policy. A plain reading of the actual policies established that the bar did, in fact, have $300,000 in liquor liability coverage which would be applicable to this loss.

Years ago, permit premises would buy what was called the "restaurant package" policy, which consisted of a CGL policy and a separate Dram Shop policy.  The CGL policy covered everything but excluded liquor, and the Dram Shop policy covered the liquor.  The two policies together covered all types of liability a bar or restaurant would face, effectively creating a seamless web of coverage.  As time passed, new causes of action emerged, and the Dram Shop policy was expanded to a liquor liability policy with broader coverage.  Sometimes one or both policies would exclude assaults, depending on the company.  In this case, the attorney for the insurer only read one policy and didn't understand the two-policy structure.  The moral of the story is that if your policy has a liquor liability coverage limit, which this policy had, you likely have the coverage regardless of what the CGL language says.  

Pending Liquor Law Changes

                There are several bills being considered by the Judiciary Committee which make significant changes in liquor law liability. I recently attended the public hearing on the bills listed below with Mr. Scott Wessing, National Claims Director for Insurance Indemnity of DC, one of the largest liquor liability insurance companies in Connecticut.  We had been invited to testify by Ms. Pat Shea of the Connecticut Restaurant Association. The bills we addressed are below.

 Raised Bill 490: An Act Concerning the Liability of Servers of Alcohol

                There are several interesting proposals in this bill.  First, the cap on dram claims would be reduced to $100,000 from $250,000 where the establishment makes a breathalyzer available to patrons.  The cap would be reduced to $50,000 where an establishment puts all of their liquor servers through a recognized training program such as TIPS or SMART.   I agreed with this change as it reduces liability for permit establishments.  Another proposal of the bill is to increase the statutory notice requirement from 120 days to 120 days AFTER the police report is issued.  I was against this change as most establishments have video or license scanning equipment which erases after 120 days.  All this does is make places easier to sue.

 Raised Bill 5536: An Act Concerning the Dram Act

                  Changes the Dram Act to require that the sale be made DIRECTLY by the seller to the intoxicated person.  This would remove liability under the Dram Act for situations where a person buys a tray of drinks for a table, a person gets drunk at a table who the bartender never sees, and an accident occurs.  I was in favor of it.

Raised Bill 5378: An Act Concerning the Tolling of Time Periods for Bringing a Dram Shop Action While Police Investigations are Pending

                  Pretty much the same thing as the notice section of Bill 490 above.  I was against it.

                  The full language of each of the above bills can be downloaded from http://www.cga.ct.  At the top of the screen, you'll see a box that says "Bill."  Just type the ;number of the bill in the next box and search.  Double click on the blue"Raised Bill":under the Text bar, and there you are.  The bills are still in committee, but you might like to call your state senator and representative to give them your opinion.

            LIQUOR LIABILITY                MARCH 2010                                     ISSUE XI

Employee Training

            I tried a lot of liquor liability cases over the past year.  While the cases involved everything from bar fights to auto accidents, the type of employee training and the content of employee manuals come up over and over again. The training generally comes up in two areas: safe alcohol service and security.  To the extent that I've lost cases, a significant factor in the juror's decision is the existence and level of training.  Jurors have told me post verdict that they didn't feel the bartender was experienced or that the bartender didn't know what to do when a patron started drinking heavily.  As DUI thresholds drop and alcohol related crashes make headlines, the average person begins to see alcohol as a danger and permittees as the purveyors of a dangerous commodity.  When I am able to present my client's employees as trained professionals acting in a responsible manner, the chances of a successful trial increase dramatically.

            Insofar as safe alcohol service, there are a variety of courses available: TIPS, TAM, SMART and a number of others.  I am most familiar with the TIPS and SMART programs as I have observed TIPS training and helped to develop the SMART program.  While the programs obviously teach methods of responsible service, their value at trial has little to do with the service itself.  First, the simple fact that the employees have been trained at all shows a responsible attitude on the part of the owner.  The certificates of completion make excellent exhibits to pass around the jury box.  Most importantly, a witness who has gone through training is able to articulate basic intoxication levels, signs of intoxication, and proper responses to intoxicated patrons.  One aspect of training which is often overlooked is that the owners must go through the training themselves.  While employees often testify, owners are always present at trial and must often testify themselves.  If they have no knowledge of the training at all, it's difficult to paint them as responsible sellers.  Each of the programs has a cost, but insurers such as IICDC and several wholesalers will often provide the training for free.

            Security training was almost nonexistent as recently as 5 years ago.  Indeed, I tried a case some years ago and successfully argued that there was no such thing as security training for bars. Things have changed.  Security training is available from a number of sources in Connecticut, and insurers such as Insurance Indemnity Corporation of DC actually provide it for free for their insureds.  I have attended several training programs and am frankly impressed with both the teachers and the programs.  Most recently I attended a program taught by Mr. Chance Meng of Las Vegas for the Post Road Entertainment Group (Black Bear, Hula Hanks).  While a lot of material was covered, the basic premise of the program is non violent patron control through verbal and physical techniques. If you've seen Road House with Patrick Swayze, you've seen non violent patron control in action. The days of the brawny bouncers stomping disgruntled patrons are gone.  Interestingly, the program encourages a "total premises" approach where the bar policy and dress code are tuned to crowd control and effective enforcement.  This may sound complicated, but the result is a clear, workable behavior policy which is easy to enforce and leaves little room for exceptions and guesswork.

             I suppose that if there is any single reason that all bartenders and security staff haven't had training, it's cost.  When I was first introduced to the TIPS program some 17 years ago, the training took two full days and cost several hundred dollars a person.  As stated above, however, many bartender and security programs are provided free by insurers and wholesalers. Even if there is a cost, insurers will often reduce premiums for trained  establishments.  Check with your agent.

        The 2010 Connecticut Liquor Statutes and Regulations Handbook is now available for ten dollars for all Connecticut Permittees.  The ten dollars is just for printing and shipping cost.  To obtain a copy, please call our office at 860.767.9044, or send an e-mail to monicastone@trendowskilaw.com.

Jury Rules that Security Acted Properly in
Escorting Unruly Patron from Pub

               On February 19, 2010, a Hartford jury upheld the actions of the security staff of the Pig's Eye Pub when they attempted to physically escort the Plaintiff, Thomas Marzano, from its premises.  This decision addresses a very important issue facing a lot of establishments and provides guidance on how security staff members should properly escort a patron out who does not want to leave.

            The incident in question took place on March 17, 2007.  The Plaintiff was having a heated argument with a female patron who was later discovered to be the Plaintiff's sister.  A security staff member testified that he asked them to calm down, and that they did, for a few minutes.  The Plaintiff and his sister deny that this first warning occurred.  The same staff member testified that approximately twenty minutes later he saw the Plaintiff choking his sister.  In response to this observation, the staff member immediately went over and told the Plaintiff he had to leave, wrapped his arms around the Plaintiff, and began walking him towards the front door.  The Plaintiff was struggling to get free and fell while he was being walked toward the front door. The Plaintiff and his sister both deny that the Plaintiff ever laid a hand on her that night.  The sister did admit that she jumped onto the back of the staff member escorting her brother to the door.  While she claims that she did this after her brother fell, three staff members testified that the Plaintiff was still standing just prior to the sister jumping onto the back of the security member.

The issue the jury had to decide was whether or not the security member had a reasonable belief that the female patron was in danger when he acted, and that there was an objective basis for the belief that the female patron (the Plaintiff's sister) was at risk of imminent physical harm. In reaching this conclusion in finding in favor of the Defendant establishment, the jury had to also conclude that the security member used only reasonable force to escort the Plaintiff towards the door.  In support of the reasonableness of the force utilized, and in addition to the above evidence, there was testimony that the security staff left the Plaintiff alone as soon as he fell and stopped being a security risk.  No appeal or post trial motions were filed in the case.

            In training security staff members, there are a few guidelines to make sure that each staff member knows.  First, there are only three circumstances in which a staff member is authorized to use physical force against another person.  These include the defense of himself/herself, the defense of a third person and the defense of the premises.  Second, in defending a person the staff member using the physical force must have a reasonable belief that the person he/she is defending is at risk of imminent physical harm.  The circumstances must also be such that a reasonable person looking at the same facts as the staff member would also conclude that the person was in danger of imminent physical harm.  Third, the force used by the staff member must be only that force that is reasonably necessary to protect the person in perceived imminent physical harm; i.e. the minimal amount of force that will prevent the harm.  Fourth, the same reasonable force restriction on the use of force applies to the defense of premises.  Finally, staff members can use physical force in defending the premises by removing a criminal trespasser.  A patron becomes a criminal trespasser once he is asked to leave by an employee with authority to do so and the patron fails to leave after being given a reasonable opportunity to do so.

           The plaintiff, Thomas Marzano, was represented by John Houlihan of Riscassi and Davis, and the Defendant, Pig's Eye Pub, was represented by Greg Allen of Trendowski & Allen, P.C.

LIQUOR LIABILITY               JANUARY 2010                                      ISSUE X

Email Extortion

                When the club owner opened the plain envelope and started reading, the letter seemed to be innocuous.  “Over the last two years alone, I have received at least 11 unsolicited email advertisements from your organization to my Yale University account.”  The letter then went on, however, to cite Connecticut General Statutes, Section 52-570c, which is an anti-spam statute providing damages of $500.00 per unsolicited email.  The letter then went on to demand a $4,500.00 “settlement,” or the writer would file suit and even try to organize others to sue the club. There were a number of other threats.  The multi-page letter ended with, “I am sure that your illicit electronic mail advertising campaigns have yielded you much greater profits than $4,500.00 through greater patronage.  Now is the time to give back some of those profits to me, an aggrieved party, and very reasonably hope that your legal conundrum will most likely blow over.  I hope you realize the gravity of this situation and make the prudent choice to settle this matter with me to make this all go away.”

                The club owner didn't settle.  The writer filed suit.  While the suit ultimately was resolved in the club owner’s favor, he had to retain an attorney and defend the matter. A successful defense is not, however, the point of the story.  When the letter writer appeared at court, he stated that he was amazed that the club owner had decided to fight because “all the other bars paid quite quickly and without any problem.”  This is the sad point of the story, that the creep who abused the legal system had played this extortion game with other places and succeeded.  For all I know, he’s still at it.  That is the point of this article. If you receive a similar letter in the mail, you should seriously consider fighting it, or at least calling the police or the attorney general.  If you would like a copy of the original letter and the subsequent lawsuit, just email a request to jantrendowski@trendowskilaw.com and I will send it to you.

The Resurrection of Negligent Service of Alcohol to an Adult

                In Piontkowski v. Agan, Judge Riley of  the Judicial District of  Windham held that a social host can be legally liable for the negligent service of alcohol to an adult.  The plaintiff alleged in his complaint within a premise liability count that the defendant, Kevin Agan, negligently furnished alcohol to his brother, Jason Agan, "whom he knew or should have known to have a propensity to become violent under the influence of alcohol" and whom assaulted the plaintiff.  The defendant moved to strike on the ground that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action against a social host for negligent service of alcohol to an adult.  In the landmark case of Craig v. Driscoll, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a negligent service of alcohol cause of action, stating: "[I]t is now time to discontinue the fiction that the behavior of anyone who is under the influence of alcohol is automatically, as a matter of law, an intentional intervening act that relieves the liability of a vendor of alcohol even though the vendor's negligence is otherwise established." The Connecticut General Assembly responded quickly, passing P.A. 2003, No. 03-91 to amend the Dram Shop Act to include the following: "Such injured [person] shall have no cause of action against such seller for negligence in the sale of alcoholic liquor to a person twenty-one years of age or older."
                Now that the dust has settled, it appears that the trial courts are interpreting the amendment to apply only to alcohol retailers.  In Raymond v. Duffy,
a 2005 decision of the Connecticut Superior Court, Judge Barbara Quinn wrote, "Unquestionably the Dram Shop Act, as amended by Public Act No. 03-91, legislatively overrules Craig as it applies to sellers of alcoholic beverages."  In all other respects, Craig is good law.  Following the reasoning of Raymond, the court holds that a social host, who also owns property, can be held liable for the negligent service of alcohol to an adult under the common law.  This case is notable because it seems to directly conflict with the Connecticut Appellate Court decision last month in Jordan Pike v. Blake Bugbee et al that social host liability only applies when alcohol is furnished to minors.  The current trend in the Superior Courts is also notable because it allows for lawsuits against private citizens who furnish alcohol as social hosts without the $250,000 cap on damages fixed by the Dram Shop Act.

                This case is important for at least two reasons. First, this cause of action must be kept in mind while considering apportionment complaints and the addition of other potential defendants to a case.  Second, this cause of action allows for an additional potential avenue for subrogation recovery.  Notably, most homeowner policies do not expressly exclude liquor-related claims and, as such, are generally denied to provide coverage.

LIQUOR LIABILITY               DECEMBER 2009                                    ISSUE IX

                As I mentioned in the last issue, more suits are being filed claiming injuries from insufficient security.  Mr. Chris McGoey, a recognized expert in a variety of security areas, has kindly allowed me to reprint a few of  his excellent articles on security considerations for bars and nightclubs.  While the articles are not tuned to any particular jurisdiction, the points he makes are certainly valid.  For more information on Mr. McGoey’s publications and credentials, please visit his website at www.crimedoctor.com.

Nightclub & Bar Security

Bouncers Doormen Need Training


                Nightclub bouncers and doormen
have been known to physically eject obnoxious patrons with such force that they have suffered serious injury or occasionally a death. It always makes me wonder what led up to this violence and if excessive force was necessary? As a general rule, a bouncer should never lay hands on a nightclub patron, except in a self-defense or arrest situation. If you think about it, what other business type has to use bouncers to bodily eject paying customers into the street?

Bouncers

                The industry term bouncer presents an image of someone who will physically break up fights and forcibly eject undesirable patrons. Bouncers are often portrayed in movies as tough, thug-like scrappers who love to fight, like in the movie "Road House". Many nightclubs foster that image by hiring over-sized, ex-jocks or body-builders to handle drunken or out of control patrons. Are big burly guys necessary to prevent violence in a nightclub? Many of these bouncers have little experience and receive no real training. In a crisis, inexperienced bouncers will be forced to rely on their own common sense and physical instincts to solve a problem. This is a scary concept.

                The duty of a bouncer is to monitor the crowd to see that everyone behaves and follows the house rules. The goal should be to see that everyone has a good time but within limits. The best bouncers are personable, friendly, and can talk to people without appearing threatening or intimidating. Not all bouncers should be male. The best bouncers don’t bounce anyone…they manage people. The mere presence of a well-trained bouncer should remind the patron that their conduct is being monitored. To be effective, a bouncer needs professional training on how to manage and control a packed house.  Bouncers must watch over the club so it does not get too intense, the crowd too large, and keep a sharp eye out for intoxicated patrons.  In a nightclub setting, the combination of too much alcohol, testosterone, and machismo can sometimes lead to physical fights over seemingly insignificant issues.

Job Requirements

                The very nature of a bouncer’s job is to be confrontational and serious incidents can develop if mishandled.  Before being turned loose into a disagreement between customers, bouncers need to have had training and preferably prior experience.  When hiring a bouncer, you must look for someone with the proper attitude and demeanor.  You don't want someone who is hot-headed or likes to fight.

                Thorough pre-employment screening is necessary to determine an applicant's suitability for the job.  For liability reasons, ex-felons should not be employed or anyone with a history of violence.  The physical aspect is only one attribute essential for the job. Bouncers need to learn how o approach people in a non-threatening and professional manner.  They need to earn about criminal and civil law applicable to use force against another and heir power to arrest.  Bouncers must also be taught about the limits of their authority and the amount of force that can be lawfully and safely applied.

                Because of my work as a consultant, I am aware of incidents where bouncers have severely injured ejected customers. I have heard many stories about fights where bouncers have pummeled a customer while in the process of ejecting them from the premises. There have been cases where intoxicated customers have been killed after being taken into custody by bouncers by either asphyxiation or by use of deadly force. This is not supposed to happen.

                There’s a common misconception that bouncers have authority to pick someone up and physically remove him or her from the premises for violating a club rule. It is believed that bouncers can use pain compliance holds, full-nelsons, choke holds, wrist locks, and arm bars to manhandle their patrons. This is generally not true. Simply stated bouncers cannot legally use force against a patron being escorted out unless they are taking someone into custody for a crime or in self-defense. When force is used it must be reasonable depending on the circumstances. Ordinarily, that means no tackling, no punching, no kicking, no choking, no head butts, no piling on top, no hog-ties, and no pain compliance holds unless in self defense.

                The authority of a bouncer, in most cases, is the same as any ordinary citizen. Bouncers have no special authority to physically eject a customer who merely becomes intoxicated or verbally obnoxious. As an employee of the nightclub, bouncers can only demand that the undesirable customer leave. If the customer refuses to leave your only legal recourse is to call the police. Sometimes a warning that the police will be called has the same effect causing the customer to depart. The police can remove an unwanted patron and issue a formal trespass warning not to return. In a few states, bouncers may legally use minimal force to remove a trespasser after being duly warned. If the customer returns after receiving this formal warning they are subject to arrest.

Deadly Restraints

                A common liability issue involving bouncers has been the use of restraints and control holds to remove or subdue a patron. Bouncers have used various forms of headlocks and choke holds on disruptive customers and caused serious head and neck injuries, asphyxiation, and even death. Handcuffs have been inappropriately applied and in doing so caused broken arms, dislocated shoulders, and have cut off circulation to hands causing permanent damage.

                Nightclub patrons have died from positional asphyxiation after being handcuffed from behind and then laid face down on the floor or from other bouncers piling on top. You can't breathe very well in that position especially if the victim is overweight. In most cases the offending bouncers were discovered to have no formal training or experience using handcuffs or control holds and weren’t told about positional asphyxiation. Watching the Worldwide Wrestling Federation or Extreme Fighting on TV is not considered proper training in use of force for nightclub bouncers or security personnel.

What’s Needed?

                The nightclub and bar industry needs to address these important security issues in their trade journal publications and at trade show seminars. Bouncers and door hosts need to be screened to weed out unsuitable applicants like violent felons. Real training should be provided to all those responsible for crowd control. Bouncers should have at least basic training in laws of arrest, verbal judo, first-aid, and even CPR if they are responsible for monitoring patron conduct and physically ejecting or arresting those who become obnoxious. Popular nightclubs should consider hiring off-duty police officers to work outside the front door to support the bouncers and act as a deterrent. Bouncers should be required to complete written reports and logs of activity where the police were called or a customer was contacted and asked to leave. These reports should be reviewed daily by club management and filed for future use in case a lawsuit is filed against the club.

                Bouncers are most visible aspect of security in a nightclub or bar is the often the huge guys working in a club. The proper application of bouncers and doormen as part of a nightclub and bar security plan are important. Inadequate security procedures could contribute to the Death of a Nightclub.

Doormen

                The doorman or door-host is the first person the patron sees and sets the tone for the style and attitude of the club. Some clubs employ burly-looking guys who set the tone of the "Barbary Coast" days in San Francisco where bothersome patrons would be forcibly thrown out into the street. Other clubs use well-dressed ladies and gentlemen to make patrons feel like they have entered a nightclub with dignity and class.

                The true function of a doorman is to provide access control for a busy nightclub and screen those that enter. A doorman is traditionally the person who stands at the door and checks IDs to assure that each patron is of age to legally enter the establishment and is dressed appropriately. In some urban clubs, doormen use metal detectors and pat downs procedures where the format attracts mostly young people and has an expectation of finding weapons. Another function of a doorman is to prevent admittance to those that are obviously intoxicated or who have previously caused trouble inside the club. Most clubs have an "86" policy where objectionable patrons are barred from returning to the club for some designated period of time. Depending on the club, a doorman can be used to collect cover charges, tickets, or direct patrons to tables.

                In addition to normal doorman duties, some nightclubs use the door staff to monitor patron conduct on the sidewalk as well as inside the club. The nature of this additional task can lead to confrontations with aggressive nightclub patrons if not handled professionally. Obviously, more training and experience is required as the doorman becomes more assertive and begins to assume more security-like duties. Most busy nightclubs begin to have problems at the door when too many duties are heaped on to an inexperienced and poorly trained doorman.

Bouncers

                Bouncers are an enigma. The term bouncer presents an image of a brawler who will break up fights and forcibly eject obnoxious patrons. Bouncers are often portrayed in movies as tough, thug-like scrappers who love to fight, like in the movie “Road House”. Many nightclubs foster that image by hiring over-sized ex-jocks, wrestlers, or martial artists to handle drunken or out of control patrons. Usually these bouncers have little experience and receive no real formal training in criminal or civil law that they must apply. See my web page Bouncers Need Training.  In a crisis, these inexperienced bouncers will be forced to rely on their own common sense and instincts to solve a problem. This can be a scary concept.

                The duty of a bouncer is to monitor the crowd to see that everyone behaves. The goal should be to see that everyone has a good time, but within established limits. The best bouncers are personable, friendly and can talk to patrons without appearing threatening or intimidating. The best bouncers don’t bounce anyone…they talk to people. The mere presence of a well-trained bouncer will remind the patron that their conduct is being scrutinized and that their patronage can be revoked.

Floor Men

                A better job title for a bouncer might be floor man or floor person. In the UK you often hear the titles of Head Doorman or Cooler. A nightclub is about the business of providing hospitality where people can come to relax, unwind, and have a good time. A good floor man will manage the patrons inside a club and will see to it that no one becomes overly aggressive and spoils the party. A well-trained floor man will circulate throughout the club, be highly visible, and be easily identifiable as a club employee. The floor man should continually evaluate the conduct and attitudes of each patron and watch for changes behavior. Let’s face it, drinking alcohol in a nightclub setting is designed to remove inhibitions and subtle behavior changes are expected. A floor man's job is to recognize the negative behavior changes and begin to manage the patron. Good floor men will use eye contact and body language to let troublesome patrons know that their conduct is reaching the threshold for unacceptable behavior.

Rule Enforcement

                It is up to the nightclub to set conduct limits and then require the floor man to evenly and fairly enforce those rules. The best run clubs enforce rules and do so immediately. A well-timed and discreet comment from the floor man about offensive language or noise level is all that is necessary, in most cases, to resolve objectionable behavior. Sometimes, second reminders are necessary followed by warnings that further conduct will result in being asked to leave the premises. Any patron who aggressively rejects a reasonable request to behave should be asked to leave. Remember though that rule violations are not the same as crimes. You can’t manhandle patrons or physically take someone into custody for violating a club rule.

                The biggest mistake a floor man can make is to ignore a patron who has become a nuisance and hope that they will either calm down or leave on their own. The worst case scenario can occur when another patron is forced to confront an overly aggressive customer on their own because the floor man was oblivious to the situation. Ultimately, the situation becomes explosive, a fight breaks out, and the floor men are forced to physically separate and eject the brawlers. This is not only bad business, but can become dangerous for everyone involved.

Patron Ejection

                Having to eject a patron from a nightclub doesn't always mean that the floor man did not manage them properly earlier in the evening.   Sometimes people come into a nightclub just looking for trouble, or can’t handle alcohol, or can’t interact socially with others. Sometimes, patrons bring their outside anger inside the club and no one knows about it until violence erupts.  These people need to be asked to leave the club by the floor man as soon as their hostile conduct becomes evident.

                No one likes to be asked or told to leave an establishment, especially if they paid a cover charge to get in. If a floor man has reminded the guest several times about their conduct then it will come as no surprise when finally asked to leave. If the patron is taken aside and discreetly told about the decision, the likelihood of an aggressive exchange is reduced. There is nothing worse than having a big bouncer-type approach a young man, in front of his friends, and tell him to leave. After embarrassing this young man, you are guaranteed to get a verbal barrage of insults and foul language that may escalate into a physical fight.

                If it becomes necessary to escort an aggressive patron to the door, floor men should be well trained to do so. For safety purposes, a rule of thumb is to have at least one more floor man present than the number of people being escorted out. Unless a patron has committed a crime, floor men are generally not allowed to use physical force. This is not to say that you cannot slightly touch a patron to guide, direct, or block re-entry. Force should only be used in self-defense or for the purpose of detaining a criminal for the police. Punching, kicking, tackling, dragging, or putting someone in a choke hold are all inappropriate methods for floor men to remove someone from a nightclub. Unlike the movie "Road House" it is never appropriate for a floor man to punch a patron out of anger or because of a challenge to fight.

                Escorting a patron out of a nightclub involves the use of professional verbal commands and a polite explanation of why they are being asked to leave. If a patron has been dutifully warned previously, then it will be of no surprise. If the conduct of the patron was obviously inappropriate, then likewise it should be clear why they are being escorted out. If the patron has been over-served and is intoxicated the ejection request may be more difficult.

                If a floor man is expected to consistently enforce the rules, there can be only two ejection choices for the patron. Either leave the premises quickly and quietly or be arrested by the police. Once a patron has been asked to leave by the proprietor, they become subject to trespass laws if they fail to leave. In some states, trespassers can be removed from the premises using minimal holding force. Typically this involves one bouncer holding each arm while leading the trespasser from the club. Floor men must be prepared to take a little verbal abuse if a patron is asked to leave. Likewise, floor men should consider a refund of the cover charge, if any, for ejected patrons to remove that point of contention. If the patron becomes combative they may become subject to assault and battery charges and it goes downhill from there.

                The floor man should be certain that the ejected patron understands that they must leave the premises immediately or be subject to arrest by the police. If the ejected patron attacks a floor man, reasonable force can be used in self-defense. Reasonable force can also be used to take an assailant in to custody for the police. If you do this, it is important to actually file criminal charges or risk for false imprisonment lawsuit. Under no circumstances should excessive force be used. (See my webpage on Use of Force Continuum for more details on use of force). Headlocks and pain compliance techniques (i.e. arm twisting, wrist locks) are not appropriate ways of escorting a rule-violator from a club.  Choke holds and sleeper holds should never be used except in life threatening scenarios. Floor men should also use care when taking a patron down to the floor, handcuffing, and piling on top. Intoxicated or overweight persons have died from positional asphyxiation from too much body weight pressing them to the floor.

Customer Fights

                If two or more customers mutually get into a fistfight, they must be removed from the club immediately for everyone’s safety. The question is how to do it safely? The old fashioned method was to throw both parties out into the street and let them duke-it-out for themselves is wrong. The correct method is to delay the ejection of the more passive offender, if possible, until the more aggressive co-combatant has completely vacated the property. The reason for this is that it is foreseeable that two people who were engaged in a fight inside will continue the assault outside. The nightclub floor men have no legal basis for detaining someone unless a crime has been committed and cannot hold someone who wishes to leave voluntarily and continue to fight. However, the floor men has a duty to be reasonable and see that known offenders have left the property and to call the police if they know a fight is about to occur or if one combatant requests it.

The articles above are printed as written by Chris E. McGoey and reprinted from

www.crimedoctor.com with permission.

GENERAL LIABILITY                 MARCH 2010                                     ISSUE XII

Defendant Allowed to Bring Third-Party Apportionment Claim
Against Plaintiff's UIM Insurer Under Certain Conditions

               The Hon. Terence Zemetis recently held in Kimberly Wheeler et al v. Eileen Wojtowicz, Conn. L. Rptr. No. 16, 578 (January 11, 2010), that a defendant in a motor vehicle accident case may bring a third-party apportionment claim against the Plaintiff’s UIM insurer based on the alleged negligence of an unidentified third motorist, provided that the plaintiff has asserted a direct UIM claim against the insurer prior to the scheduling of oral argument of the insurer’s motion to strike.

              The above case involved a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused in part by debris on the road that had fallen from an unidentified vehicle. The defendant, Wojtowicz, properly served an apportionment complaint against the plaintiff’s insurer, GEICO, for the imputed negligence of the unidentified tortfeasor pursuant to the plaintiff’s UIM coverage.  Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim against GEICO, which had already appeared and moved to strike the apportionment complaint. GEICO argued that the apportionment statute is limited to “persons,” and that insurers cannot be added under the statute.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has previously affirmed a trial court’s decision to strike an apportionment complaint against a “John Doe” unidentified hit and run driver, recognizing that “there has to be an identifiable person upon whom to serve a complaint.”  Eskin v. Castiglia, 253 Conn. 516 (2000).   However, in Collins v. Colonial Penn, 257 Conn. 718 (2001), the Supreme Court required the trial court on remand to instruct the jury on apportionment after the plaintiff’s UIM carrier had settled with the plaintiff during trial.  In Collins, the plaintiff sued his UIM carrier because the defendant claimed that his car was rear-ended by an unidentified driver, which caused his vehicle to be propelled into the plaintiff’s vehicle.  The Court held that because the UIM carrier was an original defendant in the case, “the obstacle of [the apportionment statute was] not present.”  The Court noted in Collins that it was significant that the plaintiff could recover against a UIM carrier as a surrogate for the unidentified driver, unlike in Eskin, where the apportionment complaint was brought against an unidentified person.

Likewise, Judge Zemetis held in Wheeler that the obstacle of the apportionment statute was not present, as it was in Eskin, since the plaintiff had moved to amend her complaint to include her UIM carrier after the Defendant’s filing of the apportionment complaint.  Unfortunately, for defendants, this case provides plaintiffs with “gatekeeper” ability in regard to apportionment in similar circumstances.  However, once the plaintiff brings a direct action against her UIM carrier, the two cases may then be eligible for consolidation.   


GENERAL LIABILITY              JANUARY 2010                                       ISSUE XI

Supreme Court Affirms Defense of Superseding Cause for
 Intentional and Criminal Third Party Acts

                In the recently decided Supreme Court case of of Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 292 Conn. 150 (2009), the Court reviewed the doctrine of superseding cause.  The plaintiff’s decedent was shot and killed by a third party at the defendant’s train station.  The plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s death was a result of the defendant’s failure to provide adequate security.  The defendant successfully defended the claim, arguing that the decedent’s death was the result of the intentional and criminal acts of a third party that superseded any negligence on its part.  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the doctrine of superseding cause had been abandoned by the Supreme Court.

                The 2003 decision in Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 (2003) held that the doctrine of superseding cause was to be abandoned in favor of a proximate cause analysis in negligence claims.  The doctrine of superseding cause previously relieved a tortfeasor of liability for injuries inflicted by the unforeseeable act of another tortfeasor.  The plaintiff argued that the decision to abandon the doctrine of superseding cause was to be or should be applied in all civil cases.  The Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument, noting that the 2003 decision explicitly limited the abolishment of the doctrine to subsequent negligent acts and made clear that the holding did not “necessarily affect those cases where the defendant claims an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event supersedes its tortuous conduct.”  Consequently, this case reaffirms that defendants are entitled to a jury instruction that the jury should consider whether criminal conduct of a third party was the superseding cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, relieving the defendant of liability to the plaintiff.

GENERAL LIABILITY            OCTOBER 2009                                       ISSUE X

Mandatory Pre-Suit Disclosure of Policy Limits

                October 1, 2009 is the date when many new laws becomes effective.  Public Act 09-240 was recently passed by the General Assembly and becomes law Today.  In the past, claims representatives had discretion as to whether or not they disclosed their policy limits to a claimant or a plaintiff's attorney prior to suit being filed and a formal discovery request being issued in that suit.  Public Act 09-240will change this.

                Claims representatives will now only have thirty (30) days in which to disclose the limits of their applicable policy or policies after receiving a request from the claimant or his/her attorney.  The request must be from a person alleging a death or bodily injury as a result of a motor vehicle collision involving a person covered by the insurer's private passenger automobile policy.  It must be sent to the insurance adjuster or insurance company at its last known principal place of business via certified mail.  The request must include a letter from a Connecticut licensed attorney or an affidavit from the person alleging the injuries and must include the following information:


1.  his or her juris number (if an attorney);


2.  the type of claim alleged against the insured;


3.  the date and approximate time the alleged incident occurred;


4.  a description of the injuries the insured is alleged to have caused;


5.  a copy of the person's medical bills and treatment records for the injuries; and


6.  a copy of the accident report of the collision that allegedly caused the person's injury or death, if available.

                The policy disclosure from the claims representative or insurance company must be in writing and sent out within 30 days of the request.  It must also include all the coverage the insurer provides to the insured, including any applicable umbrella or excess liability insurance.

REAL ESTATE                            DECEMBER 2009                SPECIAL EDITION

                On December 4, 2009, we learned from CATIC that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has issued a press release announcing the failure of AmTrust Bank and the assumption of all its deposits by New York Community Bank, Westbury, New York.  New York Community Bank also purchased approximately $9 billion in assets of AmTrust, with the FDIC retaining the remainder of the failed institution's assets for later disposition.

                The FDIC has established a number of websites to assist consumers who have questions about their financial dealings with AmTrust, including General Information about the bank's failure and a Question and Answer Guide.

                Most loans have been assumed by New York Community Bank. However, all nonperforming single family residential loans, acquisition development and construction loans, and land loans are currently owned by the FDIC and are being serviced by all of the same personnel with whom borrowers have worked in the past. All prior contacts remain the same for all loans.

                All lines of credit, including Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs), that were nonperforming or past due have been retained by the FDIC and these accounts have been suspended at this time. All performing HELOCs were purchased by New York Community Bank. These customers should contact New York Community Bank at any former AmTrust Bank office if they have a question about their line of credit or HELOC.

                The FDIC has indicated that all foreclosures on AmTrust loans will be temporarily suspended in order to properly evaluate the loans and the borrowers' ability to repay.

                Loans retained by the FDIC are currently being reviewed independently to determine the best action for each individual loan.  Loans may be sold at a future date. If that occurs, the borrowers will be notified in advance through written correspondence. If a borrower is concerned about whom the future lender or servicer may be, borrowers have the right to independently refinance your loan with another lender.

                Borrowers or Brokers with loans currently being processed are advised to contact AmTrust immediately to determine the status of these applications.

Information and Articles provided by CATIC were utilized in creating this newsletter.


REAL ESTATE                              AUGUST 2009                                    ISSUE VIII

Mandatory Foreclosure Mediation is Here

                The Connecticut General Assembly passed Senate Bill 911, which calls for mandatory foreclosure mediation.  Governor Rell has signed this legislation and it is being implemented already. The act required the Chief Court Administrator to establish mediation programs in each judicial district by July 1, 2009. Mandatory mediation will be available to all owners of one to four family residential properties. Under the act, if a lender commences a foreclosure on a borrower after July 1, 2009, the lender must give notice of the foreclosure mediation program by attaching to the front of the complaint a notice of the programs availability coupled with a foreclosure mediation request form. Borrowers can then request mediation by submitting the form to the court and filing an appearance within 15 days of the return date. If a mediation is requested, a court will not be able to enter a judgment of foreclosure.  Judgment may also not enter until after the period for requesting a mediation has expired.  Borrowers should also be very aware of the deadlines in this bill.  The mediation is only mandatory if the borrower requests it within the proper time period.

                Prior to the new bill, a voluntary mediation program proved to be a huge success. Seven out of every ten foreclosures that participated in the voluntary program were settled. The Connecticut Legislature hopes to continue this success by requiring a mandatory notice of the defendant's right to mediation. Any potential buyers should be aware of any pending mediations if they are interested in acquiring a property that is in foreclosure.

New Truth-in-Lending Rules Effective July 30, 2009

                The Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act (MDIA) has amended the Truth-in-Lending Act (15 USC 1601) effective July 30, 2009.  The principal objective of these Regulation Z amendments is to enable consumers to know, prior to closing, what their closing fees and charges will be. In too many cases in the past, mortgage lenders did not know the exact dollar amounts for the fees and charges borrowers were required to pay at closing, until shortly before the closing. In some instances consumers did not find out what they actually had to pay for certain fees until they appeared at the closing. This situation has proven problematic for creditors and consumers alike. The new disclosure model is intended to address this problem by avoiding "last-minute" fee issues.

Lender Requirements

                MDIA requires creditors to provide "early disclosures" to consumers within three business days after receiving an application for a mortgage loan and before any fees, other than a reasonable fee for a consumer credit report, are collected from the consumer. This "early disclosure" requirement applies not only to loans secured by principal dwellings but also to loans on other one-to-four family properties, such as "second homes."

                Once the early disclosure has been provided, the creditor must wait seven business days before closing the loan. If a change occurs that makes the annual percentage rate (APR) in the early disclosure inaccurate beyond a specified tolerance, creditors must provide new disclosures with a revised APR and wait an additional three business days before closing the loan.

Practical Implications:

 Anticipated Changes in Closing Procedures and Practice

Timely Pre-Closing Disclosures.   The rule changes should help consumers by requiring lenders to provide "final" disclosures at least 3 days before the closing.

Postponed Closings, Higher Initial Disclosed Costs, or Escrow Closings.  In those cases, however, where creditors cannot provide accurate disclosures in advance of the originally scheduled closing date, closings may have to be rescheduled. Alternatively, some creditors might disclose higher than anticipated fee amounts in their initial disclosures, in order to avoid the need for re-disclosure. Other creditors may consider the use of "escrow-style closings" (common in many western states), where the parties execute and place documents in escrow pending satisfaction of all of the closing conditions.

Changes to Loan Application, Rate Lock, and Commitment Processes.  The new rules may also impact how creditors initially accept a loan application, when and how creditors lock an applicant's interest rate and points (and collect a fee for a "rate lock"), or when they extend the deadline of a rate lock agreement or a mortgage loan commitment.

Closings on Short Notice.The new disclosure rules may also affect closings that historically have taken place on short notice, such as loan modifications and private banking loans. In the past, loan terms for these transactions might be negotiated up until closing. The impact of the new rules on such transactions is not yet clear.

New Disclosure - No Consumer Requirement to Complete the Agreement. The new rule also requires that creditors include in the initial disclosure statement and in any corrected disclosure statement the following statement:

"You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have received these disclosures or signed a loan application."

Timeshare Loans.   Creditors who make loans to finance an interest in a timeshare plan must provide the initial disclosures by the earlier of (1) consummation or (2) three business days after receipt of the consumer's application. If the initial disclosures become inaccurate before consummation, the creditor must provide revised disclosures prior to consummation (as opposed to three business days in advance).

Right of Consumer to Expedite Consummation Despite 7-Day and 3-Day Rules. Under the new rule, consumers can expedite consummation of the loan to meet a bona fide personal financial emergency.